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INTRODUCTION 
A major component of every Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is the Logic Solver.  It plays an 
important role as it is the sub-system which performs the logic in every Safety Instrumented 
Function (SIF). But sometimes there is confusion as to what constitutes:  
 
1. Validation of the SIS logic solver 
2. Proof Test of the SIS logic solver 
3. Re-Validation of the Logic Solver 
 
This paper will attempt to clarify the above with an explanation based on IEC 61508, 61511 
(ISA84.00.01). It will answer the questions “When and How” for each of the activities listed.  
BASIC CONCEPTS 
A Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is a system that implements Safety Instrumented Functions 
(SIF) to maintain or to bring back a process into a safe state. Those SIFs are classified into four 
 
different levels depending on the probability that they will be successful when asked to perform. 
That probability based level is known as the Safety Integrity Level (SIL).  
A SIF is composed of three distinct sub-systems: Sensor elements that detect certain process 
conditions, a logic solver that through some logic determines if those conditions are unsafe and 
sends commands to restore a safe state, and actuating devices that act on the appropriate process 
variables, executing the commands of the logic solver. So for a SIF to meets its SIL value, all 
three sub-systems need to perform with a certain amount of reliability. 
 
TYPES OF COMPONENT FAILURES 
IEC 61511-part 1 defines Random Hardware failures as “failure, occurring at a random time, 
which results from a variety of degradation mechanisms in the hardware”.  Online Diagnostics 
help detect SIS component hardware failures which can be dangerous leading the SIS component 
to “fail to function” on demand. The objective of Proof Testing is to reveal potential dangerous 
undetected failures which are not revealed by the online Diagnostics of the SIS component. 
IEC 61511-part 1 defines Systematic failures as “failure related in a deterministic way to a 
certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design or of the 
manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors.”  To 
reduce or eliminate Systematic errors, which are generally design based errors (both in the 
hardware and software of a SIS component), checks need to be carried out whenever there is a 
modification done to the validated SIS component after commissioning.  IEC 61508 has 
recommended techniques to reduce the Systematic errors after a SIS is commissioned.  
 
RANDOM HARDWARE FAILURE RATE  
Random Hardware Failure rate () is defined as the Number of failures per unit time 
SD, where : 
S = Safe Failure, failure which does not have the potential to put the safety related system in a 
hazardous or fail to-function state  
D = Dangerous Failure, failure which has the potential to put the safety-related system in a 
hazardous or fail-to-function state  
Additionally :  
Safe failure (λS) can be categorized as :  
            SSDSU, where 
 
Safe detected (λSD) = DCS * λS,, Safe failures detected by online diagnostics while the 
component is in use 
Safe Undetected (λSU) = (1- DCS ) * λS, Safe failures not detected by online diagnostics 
while the component is in use and can only be detected during the Proof test of the 
component 
DCS is defined as the Diagnostic Coverage of Safe failures 
 
Dangerous failure  (λD) can be categorized as : 
DDDDU, where 
Dangerous detected (λDD) = DCD *λD, Dangerous failures detected by online diagnostics 
while the component is in use 
Dangerous Undetected (λDU) = (1- DCD)*λD, Dangerous failures not detected by online 
diagnostics while the component is in use and can only be detected during the Proof test 
of the component 
where DCD is defined as the Diagnostic Coverage of Dangerous failures 
Diagnostic Coverage (DC):   
Fraction of failures detected by automatic on-line diagnostic tests.  
For dangerous failures, the fraction of dangerous failures is computed by using the 
dangerous failure rates associated with the detected dangerous failures divided by the 
total rate of dangerous failures 
 
SIL VALUE OF A COMPONENT BASED ON RANDOM HARDWARE FAILURES 
The Probability of failure on demand value for a component, in its simplest form, is expressed as 
PFDavg in all SIL calculations. This is because, a SIF component can fail on demand anytime 
between two periods of it being tested, the Proof Test Interval (PTI) and so the PFD value is 
averaged out over the PTI to calculate PFDAVG.  
 PFDavg = (D. PTI) / 2 
The PFDavg equation modifies as a sum of two parts, the Dangerous Undetected Failures (λDU) 
part which will only be detected at the next proof test and the Dangerous Detected Failures (λDD) 
part that would show up during the Diagnostic Test Interval (DTI): 
 
PFDavg = (λDU. PTI) / 2 + (λDD. DTI) / 2 
 
The PFDavg of a SIF is the sum of the PFDavg of each of the sub-systems (ie the sensor, logic 
solver and final element).  
 
Indicating the above as an equation: 
  
PFDavg of SIF = PFDavg of sensor + PFDavg of logic solver + PFDavg of final element 
 
Sometimes the SIL value is also expressed in terms of the Risk Reduction Factor (RRF):  
 
RRF = 1 / PFDavg of SIF  
 
Table 1 indicates the relation between SIL, PFDavg, RRF and Reliability 
Table 1  - SIL, PFDavg, RRF and Reliability 
SIL 
 
Average probability of failure to 






4 10-4 to 10-5 10000 to 100000  99.99% to  99.999% 
3 10-3 to 10-4 1000 to 10000  99.9% to  99.99% 
2 10-2 to 10-3 100 to 1000  99% to  99.9% 
1 10-1 to 10-2 10 to 100  90% to  99% 
 
SIL VALUE OF A COMPONENT BASED ON SYSTEMATIC FAILURES 
Presently there is no mathematical way to quantify Systematic failure rate. However both IEC 
61508 and 61511 have recommended various ways to reduce Systematic errors. A systematic 
capability scale (SC1 to SC4) measures the confidence that the Systematic safety integrity of a 
component meets the requirement of the specified SIL. As an example: 
1. A “Proven in use” process while designing and manufacturing components with good 
Quality checks will help reduce Hardware and Software Systematic failures.  
2. Poor design and detailed engineering can introduce Hardware and Software 
Systematic errors 
As an example to illustrate point 2 above, a Programmable Logic Solver may come with a SIL3 
certification from a third party (such as TUV, Exida) based on Random and Systematic failures, 
but if the application program (code) is not written , implemented and tested properly for a 




SAFETY LIFE CYCLE 
As per IEC 61511, “necessary activities involved in the implementation of safety instrumented 
function(s) occurring during a period of time that starts at the concept phase of a project and 
finishes when all of the safety instrumented functions are no longer available for use” is the 
definition of the Safety Life Cycle.  
The Analysis phase of the Safety Life Cycle is the conceptual phase in which the various SIFs of 
a SIS are identified with their SIL values and ends with the generation of the Safety Requirement 
Specification (SRS) 
In the Implementation phase the SIS is engineered and it ends with the Validation of the SIS 
During the Operation and Maintenance phase, which usually goes on till the life of the process 
unit, the SIS is regularly Proof tested and if any modifications are made to the SIS, it is Re-
validated either in part or fully 







As per IEC 61511, Validation is defined as the “activity of demonstrating that the safety 
instrumented function(s) and safety instrumented system(s) under consideration after installation 
meets in all respects the safety requirements specification”. 
When? - Validation of the SIF including the Logic Solver during commissioning and process 




SIS Validation should include the following activities:  
 
1. Testing the Hardware and Software (where applicable) of every SIF component. These 
test maybe done for each SIF component separately (i.e. when not yet hooked up together in 
the field). If a SIF component comes with a “SIL certificate” and “calibration certificate” for 
first time use, one should make sure that the details certified meet the requirement of the SIF 
application. This step also includes validation of the SIS logic solver as per details given 
below.  
Validation of the SIS logic solver could be done independently as a Factory Acceptance Test 
(FAT) and / or when installed, wired up with field instruments and powered up at site. 
Usually a FAT is conducted so that before the complete SIS validation at site, there is enough 
time to fix errors if found. SIS logic solver validation should include:  
A. Testing the Logic Solver Hardware to make sure : 
a. All Hardware components of the Logic Solver are installed and functioning as per 
the requirements in the SRS  
b. No Random Hardware failures (example – failure of a communication module 
after installation) 
c. No Systematic Hardware Failures ( example – a 24 VDC output module installed 
instead of a 120 VAC output module) 
 
B. Testing the Logic Solver Software (if it is a Programmable Logic Solver) to make sure : 
a. All SIF components interfaced to the Logic Solver are configured correctly 
b. All SIFs are programmed to function as specified in the SRS 
c. All SIFs are programmed to have Human interface as required  
d. No Systematic Software Failures ( examples – a 1oo2 input voting programmed 
for a SIF which needed a 2oo3 input voting, incorrect range of an input module 
etc.) 
 
By the end of this Validation step, all SIF components, including the SIS logic solver, are 
ready to be functionally tested together. 
2. Functional testing of each SIF per the requirements in the SRS. This is done once the SIF 
components are installed in the field , “hooked up” to the process and wired up to the SIS 
logic solver. By this time the loop checks should be complete, the SIS logic solver is 
powered up after successful installation and the process is ready for startup.  
 
Functional testing per the SRS requirements would include the following (and more):  
 
A. SIF functionality on demand. For example - A MooN input on High alarm should trip 
a valve. The process should be simulated to reach High alarm, ideally from the 
sensing device and not electronically from the transmitter, and checking if at least M 
out of N devices reach the alarm value which will trigger the SIL logic solver to trip 
the valve.  
B. SIF reset after demand and all alarms are cleared.  
C. Test procedure to bypass one (or more) of the SIF inputs.  
D. SIF input bypass philosophy – Behavior of (M-x)ooN voting when one or more (x) 
inputs is bypassed.  
E. SIF input failure philosophy – Behavior of (M-x)ooN voting when one or more (x) 
inputs has failed (either the input sensor, transmitter or the SIS logic solver input 
channel / module).  
When the SIS Validation step is completed, the SIS is ready for the process unit to start up.  
 
SIS LOGIC SOLVER PROOF TEST 
 
As per IEC61511, Proof Test is defined as a “Test performed to reveal undetected faults (both 
Random and Systematic) in a safety instrumented system so that, if necessary, the system can be 
restored to its designed functionality”.  
When? - SIF component Proof Testing needs to be done after SIS commissioning based on the 
Proof Test Intervals (PTI) considered for each SIF component while calculating the component 
PFDavg. Proof Tests are done during the Operation and Maintenance phase of the Safety Life 
Cycle 
During the operation of the SIS, some Random dangerous failures will be detected by the online 
diagnostics of the SIS logic solver and the extent to which it is detected is defined by the 
Diagnostic coverage associated with it. Dangerous failures which are not detected by the online 
diagnostics should be detected during the Proof test assuming the Proof test coverage is 100%, 
i.e. all dangerous failures not detected during operation are detected during proof test and 
rectified. 
 
Most SIL3 capable SIS logic solvers available in the market today have a very high level of 
online diagnostics which run automatically in the background. The Diagnostic coverage is a 
minimum of 99%. What that means is most of the dangerous failures are detected during the 
Diagnostic Test Interval (DTI) which is usually in seconds, i.e. 99% of any new dangerous 
failures are detected (λDD) within the next DTI and indicated as a system alarm. Only 1% of the 
dangerous failures are NOT detected by the online diagnostics and these remain as dangerous 
undetected failures (λDU). These failures could potentially cause the SIS logic solver to fail 
dangerously on demand.  
For Random Hardware failures, as we have seen earlier, PFDavg is: 
PFDavg (t) = (λDU. PTI) / 2 + (λDD. DTI) / 2 
 
As an example, for a SIL3 logic solver, consider:  
1. Dangerous failure rate, λD = 1.25E-07 failures per hour 
2. Diagnostic Coverage for dangerous failures, DC = 99% 
3. Then Dangerous Detected failure rate, λDD = λD x DC = 1.237E-07 failures per hour 
4. And Dangerous Undetected failure rate, λDU = λD x (1-DC) = 1.25E-09 failures per 
hour 
Considering a PTI of 10 years and DTI of 3 seconds:  
PFDavg of SIS logic solver = (1.25E-09 x 87600) / 2 + (1.237E-07 x 8.33E-04) / 2 
(10 years = 8760 x 10 = 87600 hours, 3 seconds = 3/3600 = 8.33E-04 hours) 
PFDavg of SIS logic solver = 1.09E-04 + 1.03E-10 
Eliminating 1.03E-10 which is a very small number: 
PFDavg of SIS logic solver = 1.09E-04, which is in the SIL3 range 
The question now is, what failures are detected by the online diagnostics and what tests need to 
be done during the Proof test to detect the failures NOT detected by the online diagnostics.  
Failures which are not detected by online diagnostics in general would relate with those failures 
which are in the incipient stage of development or not detected in earlier tests like validation. 
Examples are:  
1. High relative humidity, High temperature and High dust content in the SIS logic solver 
system cabinet which could lead to hardware failure of the electronic modules.  
2. Any loose connections of system cables which could lead to failure of communication 
between modules 
 
Some Systematic failures which could be detected and fixed during the Proof test are:  
1. A bug in the firmware of the Programmable Logic Solver informed by the  Logic 
Solver supplier after validation of the SIS, which could potentially fail the logic 
solver on demand.  
2. Poor quality of power input (say 130 VAC, 65 HZ) to the SIS Power supply (which 
can tolerate only till 125 VAC, 63 HZ) 
Most SIS Logic Solver suppliers will provide a recommended maintenance checklist and a 
suggested time period for maintenance. If the suggested time period is less than the PTI used to 
calculate PFDavg of the SIS logic solver, then the end user should follow the time period 
suggested by the SIS logic solver supplier for Proof Testing the SIS logic solver.   
Some suggested Proof testing activities for Logic Solver hardware are checking and replacing or 
fixing the following:  
1. Cable damage between SIS Logic Solver modules 
2. Voltages to the Control Processor if within the tolerable limits  
3. Temperature in the Control Processor if within the tolerable limits 
4. Airflow obstruction to various modules 
5. Presence of any earth faults  
6. Availability of spare parts 
Suggested Proof testing activities for Logic Solver Software to primarily reduce systematic 
errors are:  
1. Making sure the latest running application software has been backed up.  
2. If there has been a change in the firmware of the Logic Solver, it is recommended to 
upload the new firmware. 
3. If the new firmware was already uploaded online earlier or now, or if there were some 
modifications done to a SIF or SIFs, it is recommended to do a complete functional test 
of all the SIFs as done during validation. The reason is to make sure that a firmware 
change or modification to a validated application software has not in any way affected the 
functioning of all SIFs 
 
SIS LOGIC SOLVER REVALIDATION 
IEC61511 / 61508 do not define Revalidation directly. But it could be defined as, “activity of 
demonstrating that a modified safety instrumented function(s) and safety instrumented system(s) 




When? – Revalidation of a SIS is done during the Operation and Maintenance phase of the 
Safety Life cycle usually when:  
A. Additional SIFs may get added, or existing SIFs may get modified or deleted, during 
the next cycle of a Process Hazard Analysis (usually every 5 years in the USA as per 
OSHA regulation – 29 CFR 1910.119) or during a system audit or assessment.  
B. Modification of a SIF based on Operational feedback, for example – too many 
spurious trips, too many demands etc. 
C. Change of SIS logic Solver or other SIF components due to excessive Random and / 
or Systematic failures 
 
1. Modifications to a validated SIS are usually based on a Management Of Change (MOC) 
process. The MOC process generally details:  
A. Personnel in the company who will authorize the modification 
B. Reason for the modification to the SIS 
C. Steps of the Safety Life Cycle that need to be revisited. If the change is due to a new 
risk assessment scenario, then restart from “Process Hazard Analysis”, refer Figure 1 
D. Who and when will detail and implement the subsequent steps in the safety life cycle 
E. SIF components effected by the modification 
F. Impact analysis to make sure that this modification : 
a. Does not lead to any new potential hazardous events, either during 
implementation or after the modification.  
b. Does not effect other SIFs in the same SIS 
G. Implementation of the modification 
H. Revalidation before “startup” of the modified SIS 
I. Update of all documentation to reflect the changes done during the modification 
2. Modification to a SIF includes some or all of the following activities:   
A. Modification to any of the SIF components : 
a. addition of SIF components (example, modifying a 1oo2 Input to  a 2oo3 
input to reduce spurious trips) 
b. deletion of SIF components (example, removing a Valve from a SIF output 
which is no more required for process safety application) 
B. Modification to the hardware and / or application software (if programmable type) of 
a SIS logic solver based on changes to other SIF components, and / or change in 
philosophy of the SIF functionality itself (example, if Input is modified from 1oo2 to 
2oo3, the logic changes and so does the degradation philosophy for bypass and bad 
inputs) 
3. Extent of SIS Revalidation 
 
IEC61508, part 3, Table A.8 (refer Table 2 below), lists the activities and 
recommendations during a software modification for SIS Programmable Logic Solver. 
These recommendations can be extended to every type of SIS logic solver and for 
hardware modifications too. These techniques and measures will help detect and reduce 
both Random and Systematic failures.  
 
Table 2  - SIS Modification 
 
(R = Recommended, HR = Highly Recommended) 
 
 
A. Testing the Hardware and Software (where applicable) of every SIF component 
effected by the modification.  
Extent of testing (whether all SIFs or only effected SIFs) will depend on Table 2. 
Procedure is similar to the testing of each SIF component during Validation  
 
B. Functional testing of each SIF effected by the modification.  
Extent of testing (whether all SIFs or only effected SIFs) will depend on Table 2. 
Procedure is similar to the Functional testing of each SIF during Validation.  




The Safety Life Cycle as defined in IEC 61508 and 61511 emphasize the need to manage 
functional safety during all phases of the cycle. As part of managing functional safety, it is vital 
that: 
1. Starting from the commissioning of the SIS when it is validated and thereafter, it is 
operated upon and maintained properly 
2. Periodic proof testing to make sure that all components of the SIS are still in “good 
shape”  
3. Following a proper management of change (MOC) procedure whenever any 
modifications need to be done to the SIS. Such modifications would generally involve 
revalidation of either the effected parts of the SIS or the complete SIS depending on 
the risk reduction levels being catered to by the SIS 
 
Table 3  - Summary Table for SIS Logic Solver 
 
Activity When? Why? How? 
    
SIS Logic Solver 
Validation 
Just before taking SIS logic 
solver online for the first 
time 
Hardware test to detect 
Random failures and 
software to reduce 
Systematic failures 
Test logic solver Hardware 
and Application Software 
SIS Logic Solver 
Proof test 
During the regular 
maintenance of the SIS 
Logic Solver dictated by 
SIL calculations or SIS 
vendor 
Hardware test to detect 
Random failures by looking 
for potential errors not 
detected by online 
diagnostics and software to 
reduce Systematic failures 
Test logic solver Hardware 
and Application Software if 
change in firmware or any 
modifications have been done 
SIS Logic Solver 
ReValidation 
When modifications have 
been made to a validated 
SIS logic solver and before 
taking it online 
Hardware test to detect 
Random failures and 
software to reduce 
Systematic failures 
Test logic solver Hardware 
and Application Software. 
Extent of test will be based on 
Table 2, which is based on SIL 
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